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4 T AND GOAL: MAURICE CLARETT TACKLES
THE NFL ELIGIBILITY RULE
Written December 3, 2003 *
I. INTRODUCTION
Maurice Clarett wants to play professional football. During his
freshman season at Ohio State University, Clarett rushed for 1,237 yards
and eighteen touchdowns while leading the Buckeyes to the 2002 National
Championship.' Following his first college football season, Clarett was
voted the number one running back in college football by The Sporting
News, was awarded Big Ten Freshman of the Year, and was named to the
All-Big Ten first-team.2 His performance had National Football League
("NFL") scouts salivating over his talents, each wishing they could draft
him onto their team.3 Former Heisman Trophy winner Eddie George, now a
running back with the NFL's Tennessee Titans, commented that Clarett is
"the total package. 'A Although Clarett's dream is to enter the upcoming
NFL draft and play with the best, there is a major roadblock standing in his
way.
That roadblock is a buried paragraph in the NFL's constitution and
by-laws.5 The paragraph, entitled "Special Eligibility" ("Eligibility Rule"),
* This Comment was written prior to the decision of the Southern District Court of New
York handed down on February 5, 2004. All arguments and analysis were constructed with no
knowledge of how the court had ruled. A Postscript is included at the end of this Comment to
breakdown Judge Shira A. Scheindlin's ruling and evaluate the NFL's possible arguments on
appeal.
I. Jay Glazer, Game-day Notebook: Ball Gets Rolling on Clarett Challenge,
CBS.SPORTSLINE.COM (Sept. 14, 2003), at http://www.cbs.sportsline.comnfl/story/6639875.
2. The Suit: Clarett v. NFL, ESPN.coM (Sept. 23, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id= 1621954&type=story [hereinafter ESPN.COM].
3. See Dennis Dodd, Young Stars Make (Under)class Battle with NFL Inevitable,
CBS.SPORTSLINE.COM (Sept. 1, 2003), at
http://cbs.sportsline.comI/collegefootbalstory/6609164 [hereinafter Dodd 1].
4. Gene Wojciechowski, Good to Go, ESPNMAG.coM (Oct. 16, 2002), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/magazine/vol5no22clarett.html [hereinafter Wojciechowski 1].
5. Dodd 1, supra note 3.
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states, "[a]pplications (for the draft) will be accepted for college players
for who at least three full college seasons have elapsed since their high-
school graduation."6 Under this rule, Clarett is ineligible to enter the NFL
draft until 2005 because he is less than two years removed from high-
school graduation.7
Clarett and his family believe that the Eligibility Rule not only keeps
him from realizing his dream, but that it also severely impedes his ability to
profit from his talent.8 On September 23, 2003, after months of debate,
media pressure, and meetings with NFL executives, Clarett filed suit
against the NFL in the Southern District of New York asking a federal
judge to abolish the league's Eligibility Rule. 9 The suit contends that the
NFL Eligibility Rule constitutes a group boycott and a concerted refusal to
deal, thus harming competition 0 and violating antitrust law under section 1
of the Sherman Act ("section 1" or "the Act")."'
In all section 1 cases that contest sports league labor market restraints,
there are four basic questions:
(1) Does the challenged league rule or practice qualify for either
the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemption from Sherman Act
coverage?
(2) Is a league, at least in this particular case, a single economic
firm whose internal management practices and rules lack the
necessary plurality of actors for a section 1 violation?
(3) Is the challenged player practice or rule inherent in or
ancillary to the formation and existence of a lawful joint venture
and thus per se lawful under section 1?
(4) Is the challenged player practice or rule reasonable under the
Rule of Reason?
12
If the district court answers any of these questions in the affirmative,
Clarett's section 1 claim will fail.' 3 However, if the district court finds all
of these questions to be answered in the negative, a section 1 violation will
be found and Clarett will likely get the chance to play professional football
6. Id.
7. See Glazer, supra note 1.
8. ESPN.CoM, supra note 2.
9. Associated Press, Suit Claims NFL Rules Restrain Amateurs, ESPN.COM, at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id= 1621822&type=story (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
10. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
12. Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare
Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 337, 340 (1986).
13. Id. at 341.
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at the age of nineteen. 14
This Comment explores both sides of this historic debate, which
involves the question of whether a teenager has the right to play
professional football in the NFL. Part II presents a detailed discussion of
the parties involved and examines the governing law and 'player restraint'
case precedents. Part III analyzes how the four fundamental questions
presented above might be argued if this case were to reach the merits. Part
IV explores the policy debate surrounding the Eligibility Rule. Part V
concludes with guiding solutions on how the court can resolve this matter.
Finally, Part VI breaks down Judge Scheindlin's ruling and evaluates the
possible arguments the NFL may make on appeal.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Why Clarett is Challenging the NFL Rule?
If not for Clarett's tainted background, his challenge of this rule
probably would not have occurred. His first disciplinary problem was
exposed on July 13, 2003, when a teaching assistant at Ohio State admitted
that Clarett had received "preferential treatment" in passing a class.1 5 Then
on July 29, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") began
investigating Clarett's claim that more than $10,000 in cash and goods, an
amount surprisingly high for a scholarship athlete, were stolen from his
car. 16 Later, on September 9, university police charged Clarett with a first-
degree misdemeanor for falsely reporting the value of items stolen from his
car. 7 Clarett was then suspended from college football for a year for
violating NCAA rules concerning extra benefits and not being forthright
with investigators.'8 However, even before his suspension, Clarett admitted
that he had considered challenging the NFL Eligibility Rule when he
realized his dream and his ability to profit from his talents were being
restrained. 19
14. See id.
15. Mike Freeman, When Values Collide: Clarett Got Unusual Aid in Ohio State Class,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 2003, § 8, at 1.




19. See Gene Wojciechowski, Excerpts from Interview with Maurice Clarett, ESPN.cOM
(Oct. 26, 2002), at http://espn.go.com/ncf/s/2002/1026/1451354.html [hereinafter Wojciechowski
2l.
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B. The NFL and the Eligibility Rule
The NFL is a group of separately incorporated football clubs with
teams in thirty-two cities across the United States.20 Prior to 1990, college
football players were prevented from entering the NFL draft until they had
been out of high school for four years.2' However, during that time players
who were "non-seniors who wanted to enter the draft were granted
permission on a case-by-case basis. 2 2 In 1990, Paul Tagliabue, during his
first year as the commissioner of the NFL, altered the league's eligibility
requirements to allow college juniors to enter the draft.23 The Sports Law
Journal notes that the league "had little choice but to change the rule ... [i]t
was simply a matter of time before a junior would have sued the league for
not allowing him to enter the draft., 24 Though the rule became more
flexible, Tagliabue and the league refused to implement the kind of "open
door" policy used in the NBA where anyone over eighteen can enter the
draft.25
Despite the significance of the Eligibility Rule, the collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the league and the NFL Player's
Association ("NFLPA") lacks any mention of it.2 6 The CBA covers 292
pages, beginning with a five-paragraph preamble and concluding with a
"workers compensation" listing in the index.27 The agreement contains "61
articles, appendices from 'A' through 'N' and 357 sections. There is an
introduction, countless subsections, [and] tens of thousands of words.
There are painstakingly minute details about the salary cap, precise
guidelines on severance pay, huge sections on arbitration, collusion, injury
grievance procedures, moving expenses, and fringe benefits. '28 There is
even a specific section of the CBA that addresses the draft, its annual
timing, and when workouts for players should be scheduled. 29 Despite all
20. See NFL History: 2001-, NFL.COM, at
http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/2001- (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter NFL.COM].
21. See Liz Clarke, Boys to Men: NFL Continues to Block Young Ones, WASH. POST, Nov.
8, 2002, at DOI.
22. Id.
23. Michael Tannenbaum, A Comprehensive Analysis of Recent Antitrust and Labor
Litigation Affecting the NBA and NFL, 3 SPORTS LAW J. 205, 214 (1996).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Len Pasquarelli, Guidelines Lacking in CBA, ESPN.COM (Sept. 23, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1621876&type=story [hereinafter Pasquarelli 1].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL
[24:291
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of this, the agreement contains no explicit language defining the league's
guidelines on draft eligibility.3 °
C. The Governing Law
As in previous player restraint cases, Clarett's September 23 filing
states that the NFL Eligibility Rule reflects a concerted refusal to deal that
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.3' The purpose of the Act is to
generally prohibit any means of restraining trade or commerce. 32 Despite
the literal language of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has noted that
not every form of conspiracy or contract in restraint of trade is illegal.33
Thus, the Act should be analyzed under a reasonableness standard and
should prohibit "only contracts and combinations which amount to an
unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce. 34 This has
been referred to as the "rule of reason" analysis.35 In determining whether a
restraint is reasonable under this analysis, courts should look to see (1) if
the restraint imposed is justified by a legitimate business purpose and (2)
whether the restraint is more restrictive than necessary to satisfy that
purpose.36
Due to the lengthy and difficult factual inquiries necessary under the
rule of reason analysis, courts have presumed certain agreements and
practices to be conclusively unreasonable and therefore per se illegal under
the Act.37 By denoting certain actions as per se antitrust violations, courts
avoid "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved.. . in an effort
Players Association 2002-2008, NFLPA.ORG, at
http://www.nflpd.org/Media/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete (last visited Oct. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter NFLPA.ORG]. CBA includes provisions such as Article XVI "College Draft" and
Article XXXV "Off-season Workouts." Id.
30. See id.
31. ESPN.COM, supra note 2.
32. Thomas R. Kobin, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's No Agent and No
Draft Rules: The Realities of Collegiate Sports Are Forcing Change, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L.
483, 488 (1994) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003)). The Sherman Act provides in part that "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2003).
33. Jones v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975)
(citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911)).
34. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
35. Id.
36. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 209.
37. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063.
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to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."38 Originally, in
player restraint cases involving sports leagues, courts consistently applied
the per se rule.39 Recently however, courts have questioned these restraints
under the rule of reason analysis.4°
Before a court can question these restraints under the rule of reason or
per se approach, it is required to first address the threshold issues of single
entity status and nonstatutory labor exemptions. 41 Due to the fact that
section 1 prevents only contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint
of trade,42 application of the Sherman Act is dependent on the existence of
concerted action.43 No matter how unreasonable or anticompetitive an
action may be, in order for there to be a violation of section 1 of the Act,
multiple parties must be involved-unilateral action will not suffice. 44 If a
sports league can successfully argue that its structure is in essence a single
entity, similar to a joint venture or partnership, section 1 of the Sherman
Act will not apply.
45
Additionally, in several decisions, certain league practices of
professional leages have been insulated from section 1 scrutiny due to
nonstatutory exemptions.46 The first such exemption was judicially created
by the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.4 7 There, the Court
decided that as a result of its intrastate nature, professional baseball was
exempt from federal antitrust law.48 Though the nature of baseball
continued to change over time with the expansion of teams and media
outlets, the Supreme Court in both Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.49 and
Flood v. Kuhn50 maintained its original position that certain aspects of
baseball are and will continue to be invisible from antitrust litigation,
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 209.
41. Roberts, supra note 12, at 342-46.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
43. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir.
1984).
44. Id. at 1388-90.
45. Id. at 1387.
46. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 343-44.
47. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
48. Id. at 209.
49. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
50. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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despite the fact that Congress has remained silent.51 Furthermore, courts
have acknowledged that when a collective bargaining relationship exists
between competitors, national labor law will preempt the application of
antitrust scrutiny. In Mackey v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
provisions agreed to in a CBA would be immune from challenge by
employees under antitrust law where: "[(1)] the restraint on trade primarily
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship; [(2)] the
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining; [(3)] the agreement sought to be exempted is the
subject of bona fide arm's-length bargaining." 53 However, if none of these
factors are present, an exemption will not apply and the court will proceed
to analyze the restraint under section 1.
54
D. History of Player Restraint Cases
1. Neeld v. National Hockey League
55
In Neeld, a one-eyed hockey player presented a section 1 challenge
against the National Hockey League ("NHL") in response to a safety
provision in its by-laws.56 The suit claimed that the provision, which
banned players with sight in only one eye from participating, was a group
boycott and thus should be presumed to be per se illegal.57 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed a district court's summary judgment ruling for the league,
noting that not all concerted action should be seen as per se illegal.58 After
rejecting the per se approach, the court found that the provision was
reasonable because the ban's purpose and effect was not anticompetitive,
rather it promoted player safety. 59 Though this court failed to explicitly
address the single entity or labor exemption issues, the fact that the court
reached the rule of reason analysis suggests neither exemption applied.60
51. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; see also Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
52. Michael S. Kagnoff, While Free Agents Reap Benefits of NFL Labor Settlement
Agreement, Rookies Get Set for Further Legal Battles, 1 SPORTS LAW. J. 109, 109-10 (1994).
53. Id. at 118 (citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)).
54. See id. at 109-10.
55. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).




60. Id. at 360-61.
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2. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.
6 1
In Denver Rockets,6 2 Spencer Haywood, a highly touted college
basketball player, challenged a National Basketball Association ("NBA")
league rule that set a minimum age requirement for its players ("NBA
Rule"). 63 The NBA Rule, present only in the league's by-laws, stated, "A
person.., shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four
years after. . . his original high school class has been graduated." 64 As a
result, NBA Commissioner Walter Kennedy rescinded Haywood's contract
with the Seattle Supersonics, a professional team in the NBA.65 This action
spawned Haywood's suit alleging that the NBA's Rule was illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Act as it constituted a group boycott.
66
The court first noted that basketball, unlike baseball, "does not enjoy
exemption from the antitrust laws."67 Next, the court explained that, in this
case the NBA's uncontested engagement in interstate business coupled
with the concerted refusal to deal was a sufficient combination to prove the
NBA was not a single entity.68 Due to the fact that this rule was not
collectively bargained for and there was no nonstatutory exemption
present, the court passed through those obstacles and moved directly to a
section 1 analysis of the rule.69 Within their examination of the rule, the
court agreed with Haywood in finding that the provision constituted a
"primary" group boycott, "wherein the actors at one level of a trade pattern
(NBA team members) refuse to deal with an actor at another level (those
ineligible under the NBA's four-year college rule).",70 The harm resulting
from this type of a boycott is felt not only by the athlete, who is injured by
being banned from the market he seeks to enter, but also by the league,
whose competition is damaged by excluding those players who could
increase the talent level of the league.7 1 Furthermore, this boycott allowed
NBA teams to pool their financial power and establish their own private
government, thus monopolizing professional basketball in America.
72
61. 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1059.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1060.
66. Id.
67. 325 F. Supp. At 1060.
68. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062.
69. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 363.
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Though the court acknowledged that a rule of reason approach was
the standard in section 1 cases, 73 it observed that:
[t]he Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recognized
[the] difficulties [of the rule of reason analysis] and has declared
that with regard to certain practices the problems of making
adequate economic determinations and setting appropriate
guidelines are so complex that they simply outweigh the very
limited benefits deriving from those practices and have declared
them to be illegal per se.
74
In bypassing the rule of reason analysis, the court deemed a group
boycott to be one such practice and struck down the NBA rule as per se
illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
75
3. Linseman v. World Hockey Association
76
Kenneth Linseman, a nineteen year old hockey player, raised a similar
antitrust challenge in this case as was presented in Denver Rockets.7 Here,
Linseman challenged the validity of a World Hockey Association
("WHA") rule "prohibiting persons under the age of twenty from playing
professional hockey for any team within their association. ' ' 78 Though he
had already been drafted and signed by the Birmingham Bulls of the WHA
for the 1977-1978 season, Linseman's contract was nullified by the league
in light of the league's eligibility rule. 79 As a result, Linesman challenged
the rule on the grounds that it was an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the same claim previously made
by Haywood.8 °
Following in the footsteps of the Haywood court, and heavily citing
that decision, the Linseman court concluded that the WHA rule constituted
a primary group boycott and thus was illegal per se under section 1.8 1 The
court's discussion of the per se nature of the boycott was quite concise, it
noted that the rule "will be held illegal without regard to any claimed
73. See id. at 1062-63 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911)).
74. Id. at 1063.
75. Id. at 1067.
76. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
77. Roberts, supra note 12, at 364 (citing Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315).
78. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317.
79. Roberts, supra note 12, at 364.
80. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317.
81. Id. at 1320-21.
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justification for the restraint., 82 The court, however, did stress its dislike for
the WHA eligibility rule in that the rule's restrictions were "completely
arbitrary. 83 In contrast with Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass 'n of
America, 84 where a court approved a league rule that permitted only those
golfers approved by the PGA to compete in sponsored matches, 85 the
Linseman court felt this rule was "a blanket restriction as to age without
any consideration of talent. The court [took] judicial notice of the fact that
many teenagers have played in the professional ranks with distinction.
'" 86
4. Boris v. United States Football League
8 7
Boris v. United States Football League presented another section 1
challenge to the eligibility rule of a league, this time concerning the then
one-year-old United States Football League ("USFL").88 The rule in
question in Boris stated
no person could play in the USFL or be drafted by a USFL team
unless: (1) the player had exhausted all of his four years of
college eligibility; (2) at least five full years had elapsed since
his first enrollment in a post-high school educational institution;
or (3) he had graduated from a recognized four year college.89
Boris, a varsity football player at the University of Arizona who
sought to play in the USFL, was excluded from participating because he
failed to meet any of the three requirements of the league rule.90 After
determining that the USFL teams were economic competitors, thus
restricted by section 1, the court plainly stated that the rule constituted a
group boycott and thus was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.9'
82. Id. at 1320 (citing N. Pac. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957)).
83. Id. at 1323.
84. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
85. See id. at 171.
86. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1323.
87. Boris v. United States Football League, No. CV 83 4980, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
88. Roberts, supra note 12 at 364 (citing Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *1).
89. Id. at 365.
90. Id.
91. Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *8.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Does the Challenged League Rule or Practice Qualify for the
Nonstatutory Labor Exemption?
In analyzing the NFL Eligibility Rule, the first step is to determine
whether the rule is protected by an exemption. As noted earlier, there are a
number of nonstatutory exemptions that have been created to shield league
practices from being examined under section 1 of the Sherman Act.92 These
exemptions limit an antitrust court's ability to ever reach the merits to
determine whether the challenged practice is reasonable under the Sherman
Act.9 3 Regardless of whether a rule or agreement is anticompetitive, such as
a price fixing plan or a boycott, if the conditions for an exemption are met,
the court will never analyze the merits of the case.94
In order to force the court to ignore the merits of the Clarett
challenge, the NFL could argue that the judicially created exemption
provided to Major League Baseball should be extended to cover the NFL.95
This line of reasoning was previously analyzed by the Supreme Court in
Radovich v. National Football League.96 In response to a section 1
challenge to the league's apparent boycott of players associated with a
competitor league, the NFL asserted that "professional football [had]
embraced the same techniques" which existed in baseball at the time of
Federal Baseball97 and Toolson.9 8 Thus, the NFL contended that stare
decisis should compel the court to provide them with a similar exemption.99
In spite of this, the Supreme Court rejected the NFL's arguments and noted
that the nonstatutory exemption judicially created in those cases is
specifically limited to "the business of organized professional baseball" and
did not control that case.'00 In discussing the impact of Federal Baseball,
92. See discussion supra Part II.C.
93. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1996); see also Local Union No.
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 709-10 (1965).
94. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
95. See supra Part II.C.
96. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
97. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
98. Id. at 450.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 451.
2004]
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the court noted that baseball was the lone beneficiary of that exception and
that decision should "not be relied upon as a basis of exemption for other
segments of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise. . .. "101
In light of this Supreme Court decision, it is clear that whatever the
scope of baseball's judicially created exemption, no other sports businesses
can effectively utilize it to shield them from an antitrust challenge. 10 2 Thus,
the New York District Court should reject such an argument if presented by
the NFL.
The NFL's next logical step might involve presenting to the court the
idea that the nonstatutory labor exemption immunizes the Commissioner
and the NFL clubs from liability under Clarett's section 1 attack. 0 3 A
fundamental principal of federal labor policy is the notion that employees
have the right to collectively bargain in order to eliminate competition.1
0 4
By endorsing collective bargaining rather than individual bargaining,
federal labor policy "allows employees to seek [and negotiate] the best deal
for the greatest number.' 0 5 This freedom to contract collectively is
especially important in the context of bargaining between sports leagues
and professional athletes because of the "unfamiliar or strange agreements"
often reached. 0 6 If courts intruded and outlawed such agreements, "leagues
and their player unions would have to arrange their affairs in a less efficient
way."' 107 In response to this concern, the Eighth Circuit in Mackey noted
that if there has been a mature collective bargaining relationship, an
exemption will be created whereby labor policy may be given "pre-
eminence over the antitrust laws," thus insulating league practices.10 8
1. Does the NFL's Eligibility Rule Primarily Affect Only the Parties to the
Collective Bargaining Relationship?
According to Mackey, the first threshold requirement to obtaining this
nonstatutory labor exemption is that the league must show that the
"restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship."' 9 In terms of the rule at issue, the parties
101. Id.
102. Roberts, supra note 12, at 356.
103. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611.
104. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 961.
107. Id.
108. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
109. Id.
[24:291
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involved in the NFL's collective bargaining process are the team owners
and the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), the
union which represents current NFL players. 10 It is obvious that the
league's Eligibility Rule has an affect on owners in that it restricts who
they can draft and sign to play on their team.'11 Additionally, this restraint
affects those players already in the league in that the fewer athletes eligible
for the league, the less competition players have for slots on teams, salaries,
and playing time. In his complaint, however, Clarett claims that the
Eligibility Rule does not affect only the team owners and current NFL
players (the parties to the collective bargaining relationship) but also
prospective employees of the league." 2 Section 41 of count one of Clarett's
complaint states, "[T]he direct effect of the Rule is a restraint of amateur
athletes who were strangers to the collective bargaining process between
the NFL and NFLPA."' 13 Due to the broad restraint of the Eligibility Rule,
Clarett believes this rule is "not subject to the nonstatutory labor
exemption."" 14 This argument is similar to the ones presented and ruled on
in both Zimmerman v. NFL"
5 and Wood v. NBA. 116
In Zimmerman, the district court for the District of Columbia ruled
that a USFL player's section 1 challenge to the NFL's supplemental draft
should be denied. 17 The court came to that conclusion not based on the
merits, but rather because the labor exemption removed the draft from
Sherman Act scrutiny.1 8 During the analysis of the first prong of the labor
exemption, Zimmerman contended that though the supplemental draft was
contained in the league's collective bargaining agreement, "the primary
impact of the draft was upon USFL players who are not members of the
NFLPA."" 9 This argument, analogous to the one presented in Clarett's
claim, was discarded by that district court.' 20 There, the court explicitly
noted that "[n]ot only present but potential future players for a professional
sports league are parties to the bargaining relationship."' 21 The court further
explained that when the bargaining agreement is signed between the NFL
110. See Pasquarelli 1, supra note 26.
111. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Conn. 1977).
112. ESPN.CoM, supra note 2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See 632 F. Supp. 398 (D. D.C. 1986).
116. See 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
117. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 401.
118. Id. at 401,409.
119. Id. at 405.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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and the NFLPA, players within the bargaining unit and those who enter the
unit at a later time are bound by its terms. 122 Therefore, because
Zimmerman was a potential NFL player, he was characterized as part of the
collective bargaining relationship between the teams and the union and the
first prong of the labor exemption was satisfied.
23
Similarly, in Wood, a rookie basketball player brought forth a section
1 challenge to the NBA's salary cap and draft provisions that were
stipulated in the league's collective bargaining agreement. 24 Once again,
though a cap and draft seem to be highly anticompetitive, the court never
reached the merits of Wood's claim due to the court's application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption. 25 In defending his case against this first
prong of the labor exemption, Wood argued that the draft and salary cap
forced him to play for a specific employer at a lower wage, both working
conditions for which he could have individually bargained. 26 Because
Wood was not a member of the NBA Players Association at the time the
league's collective bargaining agreement was signed, he maintained that
these provisions were illegal because they affected employees outside of
the bargaining relationship. 27 In striking down Wood's argument, the
Second Circuit Court pointed to the fact that the National Labor Relations
Act's ("NLRA") definition of "employee" includes workers outside the
bargaining unit. 128 The NLRA states, "the term 'employee' shall include
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer."'129 The court explained that if Wood's argument were to
succeed, any employee dissatisfied with his salary relative to those of other
workers could insist on individual bargaining. 30 As a result, every
collective bargaining agreement "would be subject to similar challenges,
and federal labor policy would essentially collapse .... [Additionally,
e]mployers would have no assurance that they could enter into any
collective agreement without exposing themselves to an action for treble
damages.'
131
In light of these case precedents, Clarett's argument that the league
122. Id.
123. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405.
124. Wood, 809 F.2d at 956.
125. See id. at 956-57.
126. See id. at 960.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 153(3) (2003)).
130. Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
131. Id.
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Eligibility Rule affects those amateur athletes outside of the bargaining
process should fail. Although neither Clarett nor any other college or high
school football player received direct representation by the player's
union,'3 2 both the district court and Second Circuit Court have made it clear
that they are "potential future players" of the league and therefore seen as
"employees" who are parties to the collective bargaining relationship;
essentially receiving indirect representation. 33 This view was explicitly
embodied in the preamble of the NFL's collective bargaining agreement
which states that the NFLPA is the sole bargaining representative for
present and future player employees of the NFL, including "3. All rookie
players once they are selected in the current year's NFL College Draft; and
4. All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation with an
NFL Club concerning employment as a player.' 34 Thus, the first prong of
this nonstatutory labor exemption should be ruled in favor of the NFL and
the analysis of this immunity should continue.
2. Does the NFL's Eligibility Rule Concern a Mandatory Subject of
Collective Bargaining?
As articulated in Mackey, the second requirement the NFL must
satisfy to be protected under the labor exemption is to show that "the
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining."' 35 The NLRA provides that mandatory subjects of
bargaining include "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment.' ' 136 In previous player restraint cases, courts have been able to
easily single out whether the challenged term is a mandatory subject. 37 In
Mackey, the court found that a league rule restricting player movement
constituted a mandatory bargaining subject due to its effect on player
wages. 38 Similarly, in Wood the court found that a salary cap had an
obvious effect on wages and that a draft dictated the conditions,
specifically location of a player's employment. 139 As a result, both terms
were seen as mandatory subjects.
40
132. See generally Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. 398; Wood, 809 F.2d 954.
133. See Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405; see also Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
134. NFLPA.ORG, supra note 29.
135. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2003).
137. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
138. Id.
139. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962.
140. See id. at 961-62.
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Despite the fact that courts have had little difficulty determining what
is a mandatory subject of bargaining when faced with a discussion
concerning wages or hours, 141 the issue of an age restriction is a topic that
has escaped the courts. In Clarett's case, it is obvious that the league age
restriction has nothing to do with the working hours or wages in the
NFL. 142 Letting younger athletes compete will neither force NFL teams to
practice or schedule games at different times nor will it affect league-wide
wages-the same number of players will be drafted and on team rosters.
The success of this prong of the exemption will turn on how the New York
court will characterize "terms and conditions of employment., 143 Though
the NLRA does not immutably enumerate a list of which abstract
employment conditions will constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining,
many courts agree that the condition must have a material affect.' 44 In
Seattle First National Bank v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment' is to be
interpreted in a limited sense which does not include every issue
that might be of interest to unions or employers. .... A mere
remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient. In order
for a matter to be subject to mandatory collective bargaining it
must materially or significantly affect the terms or conditions of
employment. 145
Likewise, the Third Circuit held that only matters which "vitally
affect" terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of
bargaining. 46 If the New York court decides to follow the lead of these
cases, Clarett's objection to this second prong of the exemption should be
denied and the court should continue with its exemption analysis. An age
restriction significantly affects the terms of employment in any business,
especially the NFL. The Eligibility Rule is essentially a restriction on the
hiring practices of teams. In no way is this remote or incidental, but rather
it has a direct and material affect on the talent and makeup of players that
can be drafted into the NFL. There are a number of college players who
undoubtedly have the talent to participate in the NFL, but this hiring
restriction affects those who can be employed by the league. In NLRB v
141. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615; see also Wood, 543 F.2d at 962.
142. ESPN.coM, supra note 2.
143. See Kagnoff, supra note 52, at 11; see also ESPN.COM, supra note 2.
144. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971); see also Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.
1971); see also NLRB v. USPS, 18 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1994).
145. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d at 32-33.
146. NLRB, 18 F.3d at 1100.
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USPS, the court noted that "a hiring practice is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining where there is an objective basis for believing it to be
discriminatory."'' 47 The Eligibility Rule is no doubt a hiring practice that
discriminates on the basis of age, and thus under this reasoning should be
viewed as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
3. Is the NFL's Eligibility Rule the Result of Bona Fide Arm's-Length
Bargaining?
The final prong of the nonstatutory labor exemption fav6ring
collective bargaining will only override the antitrust laws "where the
agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining.1 48 The NLRA describes this prerequisite as "the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.., and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party[.]'9
149
Despite the fact that a provision in the NFL's collective bargaining
agreement was donated to the explanation of the challenged "Rozelle
Rule, '"5 the Eighth Circuit in Mackey held that the absence of this third
requirement meant the exemption should not apply.' 51 The court pointed to
the testimony of the player's bargaining representative, who stated that
during the process the rule was a "side discussion rather than a focal point
of the negotiations."' 152 Noticing that the rule was not only not a major topic
of discussion, but additionally, that the representative had little recollection
of the issue even coming up,' 53 the court held that no bona fide arm's-
length bargaining of the rule existed. 154 Thus, the Rozelle Rule was not
granted immunity from Sherman Act scrutiny. 155 In contrast, extensive
bargaining over a similar National Hockey League rule embodied in the
league's CBA led the Sixth Circuit in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. to
grant it protection.' 56 In spite of the fact the NHL's position on the rule
147. Id. at 1099.
148. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
150. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 616 n.17.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 616.
155. Id.
156. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979).
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remained unchanged throughout the bargaining process and that the NHL
ultimately prevailed, 157 the court stated this did "not mandate the
conclusion that there was no collective bargaining over the issue."'
158
Rather, the lengthy sessions in which each side's proposals were discussed
demonstrated that regardless of the outcome, the term was a subject of
good faith bargaining. 159
The NFL's task of defending itself on this issue will be considerably
more difficult than with the prior two requirements. Unlike the rules
advocated for in Mackey and McCourt, the Eligibility Rule is not located
within the 292 pages, 61 articles, and 357 sections of the league's
collective bargaining agreement.' 60 Though the CBA contains "Article
XVI: College Draft" and "Article XVII: Entering Player Pool," what is
noticeably absent is explicit language concerning the eligibility
requirement.' 6 1 In an interview with ESPN.com, Harold Henderson, the
NFL's Vice President of Labor Relations, admitted to this major foul up
stating, "[w]hy it didn't get into the CBA, well, I don't know. I certainly
wish it was in there."' 62 The league plans to argue that though there is no
definitive language about the Eligibility Rule, it is implicitly covered or
agreed to by reference in the agreement. 163 Stated another way, "[t]he CBA
stipulates that, if the league and NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw
are in tacit agreement, that item is, rather flimsily it seems, essentially
covered. ' ' 64 This argument is weak in comparison to the one presented in
Zimmerman, where the court accepted that there was bona fide arm's-
length bargaining only because the "record show[ed] that a fair amount of
give and take took place between Upshaw" and the league representative. 1
65
If there really was good faith back-and-forth bargaining between the league
and the NFLPA over the Eligibility Rule, it makes one marvel at how
negotiators failed to include the guidelines in the agreement when every
word is closely scrutinized and every punctuation is pored over during the
negotiation of other provisions. 166 The fact that the Eligibility Rule only
157. See id. at 1200.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1200-01.
160. Pasquarelli 1, supra note 26 (describing the NFL's CBA).
161. See id.; see also NFLPA.org, supra note 29.
162. Pasquarelli 1, supra note 26.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 407.
166. Pasquarelli 1, supra note 26.
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appears in the league bylaws, 67 outside the breadth of the CBA, furthers
the assumption that it was not bargained for at arm's-length, but rather was
unilaterally imposed by the NFL and its member clubs upon the players.
Having failed to deal with a key element of the collective bargaining
process, the league should not be granted immunity from a section 1
challenge under the nonstatutory labor exemption, and thus, will be
vulnerable to defeat under the merits of the case.
B. Is the NFL, at Least in the Particular Case, a Single Economic Firm
Whose Internal Management Practices and Rules Lack the Necessary
Plurality ofActors for a Section 1 Violation?
If the court decides to move onto the merits of the Clarett case, it is
necessary to determine whether the NFL itself is subject to scrutiny under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. As noted before, to prevail in a section 1 suit,
the plaintiff must prove that two threshold elements are present: "(1) There
must be some effect on 'trade or commerce among the several States', and
(2) there must be sufficient agreement to constitute a 'contract,
combination or... conspiracy."",1
68
In analyzing the NBA's Eligibility Rule, the Denver Rockets court
found that it was indisputable that the first of these threshold elements was
met. 169 Due to the fact that the NBA operated teams in seventeen major
cities across the United States and that games involving those teams
produced significant revenue from nationwide television and radio
broadcasts, it was clear "that the NBA conduct[ed] its business in such a
manner as to constitute interstate commerce."'1
70
Similar reasoning was applied in Linseman where the court also
concluded the WHA was engaged in interstate commerce.' 7' That court
determined that the plaintiff would likely be able to establish an effect on
interstate commerce "[s]ince the WHA operates in eight different cities,
schedules games in different states and in Canada, and derives substantial
revenue from broadcasts of league contests.''
72
Though the NFL has had to defend itself in numerous antitrust suits,
no court has ever conducted a thorough analysis of the NFL's place in
167. See Dodd 1, supra note 3.
168. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1320.
172. Id.
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interstate commerce. 173 It seems, however, that this lack of analysis is the
courts' way of concluding that as the NFL is so obviously engaged in
interstate commerce, any judicial pronouncement on this matter would be a
waste of time. This idea is exemplified in Mackey, where the court limited
this discussion to a mere footnote stating, "[i]t is undisputed that the NFL
operates in interstate commerce. '174 Similar to the NBA and the now
defunct WHA, the NFL has teams operating in thirty-two cities across the
United States, scheduling regular season games in those cities as well as
exhibition games abroad in places such as Tokyo and Mexico City.175 In
addition, NFL revenues from television contracts exceed those of any
sports league in existence, as their current deals with CBS, Fox, ABC, and
ESPN total $17.6 billion. 176 It is very hard to imagine the NFL debating
with Clarett about this threshold requirement of the section 1 analysis.
In considering whether there is a sufficient agreement between parties
to form a conspiracy, the court must determine whether the NFL should be
viewed as a single entity or as separate competing entities. As previously
noted, in order to violate section 1 there must always be multiple parties
involved in some type of concerted action which restrains trade-a
unilateral action will not suffice. 177 No matter how anticompetitive a
provision might be, if the league is seen as a single entity the analysis will
cease. 178 This issue has been previously raised and adjudicated in both
North American Soccer League v. NFL179 and Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission v. NFL.
180
In North American Soccer League, the NASL claimed that the NFL
was engaging in a concerted refusal to deal, a section 1 violation, by
prohibiting NFL team owners from having pecuniary interests in teams
within competing professional sports leagues.' 8 1 In analyzing this rule, it
173. See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 80 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). All
cases involve antitrust suits against the NFL and examine the league's status as a single entity or
engage in a rule of reason analysis without ever discussing the league's effect on interstate
commerce.
174. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616 n.19.
175. ESPN.COM, supra note 2; see also NFL.COM, supra note 20.
176. Associated Press, New Subscription Package Worth $2 Billion, ESPN.coM (Dec. 11,
2002), at http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/2002/1211 /1475429.html.
177. Los Angeles Mem '7 Coliseum Comm 'n, 726 F.2d at 1387-90.
178. Id.
179. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
180. 726 F.2d at 1387.
181. N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1250.
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was necessary for the Second Circuit to perform an in-depth examination of
the structure of the NFL to determine if the league was susceptible to an
antitrust suit.' 82 The court acknowledged that the success of professional
football depends on its ability to attract as many fans as possible to attend
and watch games. 83 This inducing advertisers to sponsor television and
radio broadcasts of the games. 8 4 In order to achieve this goal there must be
a number of separate competing professional football teams in varying
locations with sufficient fan bases and skilled players. 85 This unique
characteristic of the sport makes "some sort of an economic joint venture
essential."'186 However, this necessity to cooperate amongst NFL teams
does not automatically transform the league into a single entity.' 87 To
tolerate such a line of reasoning "would permit league members to escape
antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would
benefit their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the
benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects."'188 Therefore,
the court explained that "[a]lthough NFL members thus participate jointly
in many operations conducted by it on their behalf, each member is a
separately owned, discrete legal entity which does not share its expenses,
capital expenditures or profits with other members." 89  After
acknowledging that the NFL is comprised of separate economic entities,
and thus able to engage in a combination or conspiracy, the Second Circuit
allowed the NASL to move forward with its section 1 challenge.'
90
The Ninth Circuit conducted a similar analysis and reached a
consistent conclusion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission
("LAMCC"). 191 In that case, the LAMCC and the Oakland Raiders brought
suit against the NFL alleging that the league's rules regarding team
relocation were in restraint of trade. 92 Once again, before the court could
proceed with its section 1 analysis, it had to determine whether the NFL
rule was created through concerted action.193 Despite the NFL's contention
182. Id.




187. Id. at 1252.
188. N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1257.
189. Id. at 1252.
190. Id. at 1255-56.
191. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1387.
192. Id. at 1384-85.
193. See id. at 1387.
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that the league structure is akin to a single entity, thus precluding
application of the Sherman Act, the court deemed that premise to be false,
citing the fact that each team is a separate business entity with independent
value. 194 According to the Ninth Circuit, though the NFL clubs need to
cooperate and have "certain common purposes, they do not operate as a
single entity. NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent
corporation, but by the separate teams acting jointly."' 95 Several factors
contributed to the court's conclusion that the league is not a single entity.
Some of these factors included the fact that teams are independently
owned, do not share profits or losses, and compete for players,
management, and fan and media revenue.' 96 Consequently, the court
rejected the NFL's single entity defense and moved on with its antitrust
analysis.
197
These cases serve to contradict any claim that could be made by the
NFL in the Clarett suit that they are incapable of conspiring because they
function as a single economic entity. Though the league will once again
attempt to show that the member clubs are engaged in a common business
enterprise, the current structure of the NFL has not materially deviated
"from that which existed when the identical 'single economic entity'
argument was raised by the NFL defendants and rejected by the Ninth and
Second Circuits."' 98 In the NFL today, as was present during previous
decisions, teams continue to be independently managed and owned, they
each derive separate revenues that vary widely from team to team, and the
ongoing expansion of teams has heightened the direct competition for
media exposure and fan support.' 99 Therefore, it is appropriate for the
Clarett district court to remain consistent and rule that the NFL is a
combination of separate economic entities for purposes of liability under
section 1 of the Sherman Act and allow Clarett's case to continue.
C. Is the Challenged NFL Eligibility Rule Inherent in or Ancillary to the
Formation and Existence of a Lawful Joint Venture and Thus Per Se
Lawful Under Section 1?
Case precedent has held certain agreements or practices to be
194. Id. at 1388-89.
195. Id. at 1389.
196. Id. at 1390.
197. Los Angeles Mem '1 Coliseum Comm 'n, 726 F.2d at 1391.
198. McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 879 (D. Minn. 1992).
199. Id. at 879 n.10.
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presumptively unreasonable and thus illegal because of their harmful effect
on competition and lack of redeeming value.00 Such arguments do not
require further examination into the exact harm they have caused or the
justifications for their creation.01 When a court determines that a restraint
is illegal on its face, it may completely skip the nebulous, fact specific
analysis of the restraint's effect on competition, conducted under the rule of
reason.202 A group boycott-"a concerted effort by a group of competitors
whose 'purpose [is] to exclude a person or group from the market or
accomplish some other anti-competitive objective'-is an example of
conduct that is per se illegal under the Sherman Act.
20 3
In Denver Rockets, a case comparable to Clarett, the court applied
this per se rule against an eligibility requirement.2 4 In that case, Spencer
Haywood claimed that member teams of the NBA had conspired to avoid
dealing with athletes who were less than four years beyond their high
school graduation.20 5 Haywood alleged that "the effect of [that] provision
[was] a group boycott on the part of the NBA and its teams against himself
and other qualified players who come within those terms. 20 6 The Denver
Rockets court agreed with Haywood, noting that this rule constituted a
primary boycott since NBA team owners were refusing to deal with those
athletes ineligible under the league's four-year college rule. 0 7 The
pernicious effects of the rule-the NBA operated as private government
excluding qualified players from the market, hindering competition-
forced the court to subject the provision "to the per se rule normally
applicable to group boycotts. 20 8 Although the court declined to analyze the
rule's effect on competition and did not mention the relevant market or find
that any interest protected by the antitrust laws was offended, the district
court declared the NBA eligibility rule illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.0 9
Boris v. USFL raised an antitrust question identical to the one
presented in Denver Rockets, the claims only differed in that the sport
200. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063.
201. Id.
202. See Kobin, supra note 32, at 488-89.
203. Id. at 489 (quoting Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975).
204. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
205. Id. at 1055.
206. Id. at 1060.
207. Id. at 1061.
208. Id. at 1061, 1066.
209. Roberts, supra note 12, at 363.
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involved was football.210 This eligibility rule was similarly challenged
under section 1 as an absolute exclusion of a number of skilled collegiate
athletes who were deemed ineligible under the rule.211 The district court
held in favor of Boris "finding in a single sentence, without citation or
further explanation, that the USFL's rule 'constituted a "group boycott,"
and was, therefore, a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
21 2
Another player restraint case, Linseman v. World Hockey Ass 'n,
involved a challenge to the eligibility rule of the now defunct WHA. 213 The
regulation's validity was contested on the ground that it amounted to a
group boycott and an unreasonable restraint of trade.214 In light of the
damages to the league, as well as those inflicted on Linseman's ability to
compete, the court applied the per se rule and held the concerted boycott to
be "illegal without regard to any claimed justification for the restraint.,
21 5
If the district court in the present case applies this form of scrutiny to
the NFL's Eligibility Rule, Clarett might as well throw on some pads and
start training, as he will likely be playing in an NFL game very soon. The
nature of the NFL Eligibility Rule is essentially identical to the rules
characterized as group boycotts and held as per se illegal in the previous
cases. 2 16 As was the case in Denver Rockets, Boris, and Linseman, the NFL
Eligibility Rule is no doubt a primary boycott where actors at one level of a
trade pattern, the NFL team owners, are refusing to deal with actors at
another level, Clarett and other qualified football players who are ineligible
under the league rule. 217 By relying heavily on these cases, the district court
will have no concern for dislocating the NFL's product market, competitive
balance, league efficiency, consumer welfare or other justification. The
court can with one swift act strike down the eligibility provision and
change the nature of professional football forever.
D. Is the Challenged Eligibility Rule Reasonable Under the Rule of
Reason?
Although Clarett's case appears to be resolvable under a per se
210. Boris v. United States Football League, No. CV 83 4980, 1984. U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19061, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
211. Id. at *6.
212. Roberts, supra note 12, at 365.
213. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1320.
216. See id.; see also Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061.
217. See Denver Rocket., 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
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analysis, recently courts have shifted gradually toward using the rule of
reason analysis for disputes involving sports industries. 21 8 Recent, courts
have refused to apply the per se rule where, based on the peculiar
characteristics of a business, there is a need for cooperation among industry
participants necessitating some kind of concerted refusal to deal.2 19 This
idea is paralleled within the league structure of the NFL. In the NFL, teams
are not true competitors whereby each club has a stake in the
accomplishments of other teams. 220 No NFL team is interested in driving
another team out of business because neither the teams nor the league
would survive on their own.22' Thus, courts have concluded that "the
unique nature of the business of professional football renders it
inappropriate to mechanically apply per se illegality rules. 222 In turn,
courts believe that when scrutinizing the legality of player restrictions in
professional sports, the principles of antitrust law are better served by
utilizing the rule of reason test. 23
Under a rule of reason analysis, a restraint is deemed unreasonable if
it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect.2 24 If "the restraint is
found to have legitimate business purposes whose realization serves to
promote competition, the 'anticompetitive evils' of the challenged practice
must be carefully balanced against its 'pro-competitive virtues' to ascertain
whether the former outweigh the latter., 225 A restriction will be seen as
unreasonable if the "net effect" of this balance shows that the restraint
substantially hindered competition. 226 However, even if a regulation has
substantial pro-competitive justifications, it can be struck down as
unreasonable if it is determined to be more restrictive than necessary to
achieve its purposes.227
The first step in a rule of reason analysis is to identify the market that
is allegedly being restrained.2 28 In the present case, Clarett will most likely
argue that the NFL Eligibility Rule inhibits the market for professional
football player services. Within this market, highly talented collegiate
218. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 209.
219. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
220. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1182; see also Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
224. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 209.
228. See Capital Imaging Assoc., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass'n, Inc., 996 F.2d 537,
543 (2d Cir. 1993).
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football players can be seen as suppliers or producers of labor and the NFL
as the purchaser or consumer of that product.229 It is easy to see how an
eligibility rule, which essentially limits what services can be purchased,
restrains this particular market. In a substantial number of cases, "courts
have not hesitated to apply the Sherman Act to club owner imposed
restraints on competition for players' services. 23° In Mackey, though the
NFL disputed that a restriction on competition for players' services was
prohibited by the Sherman Act, the Eighth Circuit explicitly stated that the
market for player's services was within the ambit of the Act.23' Based on
the fact that there are no reasonable substitute markets for professional
football players' services in the United States, any anticompetitive effects
of the Eligibility Rule on this market will be equally amplified.
The next phase of the analysis is to ascertain the anticompetitive evils
associated with the Eligibility Rule.232 This element which is the heart of
Clarett's argument, invokes numerous damaging arguments regarding the
extent to which the league's eligibility requirement unreasonably restrains
competition.233 First, the rule restrains the player services market by
restricting a college athlete's "chance to freely market one's labor skills. 234
Due to the restraints of the Eligibility Rule, the best college football players
in the United States are not able to utilize the free market system to benefit
from their talents235 as any American in another profession could. This type
of eligibility requirement, which places no regard for ability, is
unprecedented in the American job marketplace.236 While an M.I.T. student
at the top of his or her class can enter the job market and secure the job of
his or her choice regardless of age, the most skilled college football player
cannot market his talents until an arbitrary date passes. A sports agent
posed the following rhetorical question that echoed this sentiment, "in what
other field are roadblocks to advancement put in place? Imagine if Bill
Gates had been blocked from dropping out of Harvard to start
Microsoft. '237 This delay on a football player's ability to enter the market
229. Kobin, supra note 32, at 509-11.
230. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617.
231. Id. at 618.
232. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183.
233. See ESPN.COM, supra note 2.
234. Jeffrey D. Schneider, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free Agency in the NFL,
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 798 (1991).
235. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185.
236. See id. at 1185-86.
237. Clarke, supra note 21.
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can in many cases cause irreparable injury.238 The longer an athlete is
forced to stay in college against his wishes, the greater the chance an injury
will occur which would harm his abilities to compete professionally and
receive a corresponding financial windfall. Assume a college football
player "play[s] four years of college, say [he] get[s] 250 carries a season-
and that's not including all the hits in practice, spring ball, things like
that-so by the time [he] get[s] to the NFL it's kind of like [his] body is
beat up. '239 Were it not for the Eligibility Rule, the athletes with the most
professional market value and talent could reap the benefit of their superior
abilities regardless of age.
Second, the Eligibility Rule not only limits a player's ability to
benefit from a free market, but also eliminates a team 's ability to compete
for the services of the most talented athletes.240 The purpose of the annual
NFL draft is to allow each team to obtain the rights to incoming college
football players in an attempt to improve the quality of their team.24' In the
hopes of maintaining competitive balance throughout the league, the NFL's
worst teams from the previous year receive higher picks in the draft so that
they will have the best opportunity to acquire the most talented athletes
entering the league.242 If the NFL is truly interested in helping its teams
improve, it makes little sense to restrict those teams from drafting the most
talented players in college football solely based on age.243 Assuming that
the team with the first pick in this year's upcoming draft is in dire need of a
running back, and that team believes Maurice Clarett is the best running
back in the collegiate ranks, why should that team's improvement be
impeded because the rules prohibit the team from drafting a player that
falls below an arbitrary age? During the "1990 NFL draft, (which was the
first one that allowed juniors to enter the draft) five of the first seven picks
(including the first one ... ) were juniors.",244 This shows that the desire of
NFL teams to draft younger players based on their talent exists, but this
league rule limits the supply of young players that possess the skills and
talents to succeed in the NFL.245 Therefore, it can be argued that this rule
has an anticompetitive affect on certain NFL teams.
Finally, the quality of the league suffers because of this
238. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1320.
239. Wojciechowski 2, supra note 19.
240. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317 n.2.
241. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175-76.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 1204.
244. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 215.
245. See id. at 214-15.
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anticompetitive effect. The NFL takes pride in being the premiere forum
for professional football by employing only the most talented athletes. It
sells its product to fans through ticket, merchandise, and television
contracts by asserting it provides the highest quality football entertainment
246available. However, it could be said that the NFL is engaging in false
advertising-although a stretch-by excluding certain highly talented
athletes. Because the rule renders ineligible some of the most talented
football players in the world based on the number of years they have been
out of high school, "the entertainment product the league is trying to sell
,,247[is] not ... as attractive. If no such rule were present, the most talented
athletes could enter the league, increasing not only the quality of team play,
but also the talent level and entertainment value of the league.248 An
improved quality of football and talent on the field would also likely lead to
an increase in fan interest and, in turn, league revenues. 249 Nevertheless, the
anticompetitive effect of the rule harms the overall entertainment value of
the league.250
At this stage of the analysis, the burden would shift to the NFL to
present pro-competitive justifications for the Eligibility Rule in an effort to
depict it as reasonable. The first such justification the NFL can present to
the court is the notion of preserving safety in the league.251 Similar to
Neeld, the NFL will probably argue that the purpose and effect of the
Eligibility Rule was not to achieve anticompetitive goals but rather to
promote safety. 52 In Neeld, the NHL argued that the purpose of excluding
vision impaired players was to promote safety for both Neeld and the
players who would compete against him.253 After taking judicial notice of
the rough and physical nature of hockey,254 the court noted that regardless
of the amount of protective gear Neeld employed, he would still encounter
great danger when players approached him on his blind side.25' The court
therefore found this restraint on competition to be reasonable based on the
overriding safety justifications.2 56 Therefore, the NFL will probably argue
246. See N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1251.
247. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 210.
248. See Schneider, supra note 230, at 824.
249. See id.
250. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
251. Id.
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that the eligibility rule was designed to protect the physical well-being of
young athletes.
However, the distinctions between the pro-competitive arguments of
the NHL and the NFL are quite sharp. In Neeld, the safety ban affected a
very limited number of athletes25 7 whereas the NFL's ban potentially
affects hundreds of collegiate football players every year. Thus, the NFL's
Eligibility Rule is a stronger anticompetitive restraint on the market.
Additionally, the NHL prohibited certain athletes from competing based on
a disability the league felt would create additional dangers to an already
dangerous sport.258 In the NFL, however, the Eligibility Rule does not ban
participation based on a disability or a lack of talent, but rather imposes a
seemingly arbitrary across-the-board ban. College athletes already compete
in a "fast and violent game in which they have to withstand high-impact
collisions, 259 and where injuries are common; the NFL rule certainly is not
keeping athletes any safer by making them stay in college football.
Furthermore, the state of the art training facilities, protective equipment,
and expert medical staffs provided by the NFL might actually afford
football players with playing conditions that are safer than those players
experience in college. Finally, though the safety of players is a major
concern in every professional sport, it seems slightly ironic that the NFL is
the league that is attempting to promote this justification. More than any
other sport, "[t]he NFL is in the business of hurt. ' 260 Every advertisement
or highlight for professional football involves a hard-hitting collision.
Crowds "ooh" and "ahh" at tackles that leave players squirming on the
field. Even television coverage of NFL games cues in on player injuries,
giving viewers close-up images of broken fingers, dislocated shoulders, and
bloody uniforms. It seems difficult to be persuaded by the NFL's pro-
competitive safety justifications for the Eligibility Rule given these facts.
Another justification the NFL will likely assert is an interest in
competitive balance throughout the league. The league can argue that the
restraint on player services ensures the most mature players are on the field
as opposed to a number of young, inexperienced athletes. Under this
theory, the NFL can push the argument that with too many young players
in the league "the quality of play in the NFL would thus suffer, leading to a
257. See id.
258. See Neeld, 594 F.2d at 1300.
259. Nick Cafardo, NFL Could Get Taken to School on Draft, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10,
2003, at C4.
260. lan O'Connor, Commentary: Clarett has Every Right to Enter NFL Draft,
CENTRALOHIO.COM (Sept. 23, 2003), at
http://www.CentralOhio.com/ohiostate/stories/20030923/football/315434.html.
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reduced spectator interest, and financial detriment both to the clubs and the
players. ' 61 In its analysis of the league's Rozelle Rule, the Mackey court
acknowledged this justification stating, "[w]e do recognize... that the
NFL has a strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive balance
amongst its teams., 262 However, there is no evidence that letting younger
players in the league would have an adverse effect on the competitiveness
of the league. 63 College juniors, as opposed to seniors, were allowed to
enter the NFL draft in 1990,264 and there is no doubt that fan interest and
league revenues have increased in the past thirteen years. 65 If the quality of
play on the field had diminished as a result of letting younger players in the
league, those numbers would have fallen, but instead they have only
266increased. In purpose, this justification for the Eligibility Rule appears to
be pro-competitive, but there is nothing to show that in effect the rule is
267appropriate.
The NFL can make two related pro-competitive justifications
available for its Eligibility Rule. First, the NFL will maintain that this rule
benefits the college athlete by promoting the importance of receiving a
college education. 268 This "educational" argument has been presented to
courts before to no avail.269 In Denver Rockets, the NBA attempted to
defend its eligibility rule by stating that the rule ensures "each professional
basketball player will be given the opportunity to complete four years of
college prior to beginning his professional basketball career."270 The court
explicitly rejected this rationale as a justification for the rule, noting
261. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
262. Id.
263. See Kobin, supra note 32, at 523.
264. See Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 215; see also Associated Press, supra note 9.
265. Since 1990, the NFL has satisfied its growing fan base by adding 4 expansion teams-
the Carolina Panthers, Jacksonville Jaguars, Cleveland Browns and Houston Texans. In 2000,
"the NFL set an all-time paid attendance record ... for the third consecutive year, reaching the
20-million paid attendance mark for only the second time in league history. Regular season paid
attendance of 16,387,289 for an average of 66,078 per game also was an all-time record for the
third consecutive season." Additionally, the Super Bowl continues to be television's most-
watched event. Super Bowl XXXVII, in which the Tampa Bay Buccaneers defeated the Oakland
Raiders 48-21 at Qualcomm Stadium in San Diego, "was witnessed by 138.9 million viewers,
making [it] the most-watched program in U.S. television history." NFL History: 2001-, NFL.COM
(Oct. 8, 2003), at http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/200 1-.
266. See Dodd 1, supra note 3; see also Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 215; see also
discussion supra note 260.
267. See Kobin, supra note 32, at 523.
268. See Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *3.
269. See id.; see also Denver Rockets v. All Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
270. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
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"[h]owever commendable this desire may be, this court is not in a position
to say that this consideration should override the objective of fostering
economic competition which is embodied in the antitrust laws., 271 The
New York court in the present case should view the NFL's argument in a
similar manner. Though it is admirable of the NFL to assert an interest in
the college education of its athletes, it is not the league's, but rather the
individual's decision on how to approach collegiate life. By keeping these
athletes in college, the league is making decisions for these players which
in turn harms the market for player services in the NFL.
As a second justification for keeping football players in college, the
NFL can contend that this will keep team investments in player
development costs at a minimum.272 In most professional sports, "collegiate
athletics provides a more efficient and less expensive way of training
young... players than the so-called 'farm team' system. 2 73 Professional
football is no different, which leads to the conclusion that there seems to be
some collusion between the NFL and the NCAA to restrain the football
player labor market.274 In his article, The National Collegiate Athletic
Association's No Agent and No Draft Rules: The Realities of Collegiate
Sports Are Forcing Change, Thomas R. Kobin states:
[I]t is in the NFL's best interest to have most of these players
remain in college and develop their football skills for four or
five years. Unlike MLB and the NHL which both have well
developed minor league systems, the NFL does not have an
established minor league where younger players can develop
their skills. By having football players develop at the collegiate
level for four or five years, the NFL is able to get well
developed players without having to invest revenues into
financing their own minor league system. The NFL recently
attempted to support a lasting minor league system in the form
of the WLAF. The league was a huge financial burden on the
NFL and it was dismantled after its second season.275
Although this system and its rules are undoubtedly economically
276 ~hs~beneficial for the NFL and its teams, it has similarly been cast off by
courts involved in player restraint cases as an illegitimate pro-competitive
271. Id.
272. See Kobin, supra note 32, at 513.
273. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
274. See Kobin, supra note 32, at 514.
275. Id. at 512-13.
276. See id. at 513.
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justification.277 Linseman stated that an organized restraint of trade would
not be justified merely because it was based on economic necessity. 78 The
district court noted that "[i]f the WHA needs a training ground for its
prospective players, the principles of the free market system dictate that it




Likewise, in Mackey, the court addressed this issue and found it unavailing
in that training "expenses are similar to those incurred by other businesses,
and that there is no right to compensation for this type of investment.
'"280
Seeing how development costs are "ordinary cost[s] of doing business
and... not peculiar to professional football,2 8 1 it is understood this
argument will not succeed as a pro-competitive justification for restraint
imposed by the league's eligibility rule.
282
Even if the court did find that any of the above justifications would
offset and outweigh the anticompetitive evils of the Eligibility Rule, the
NFL would still have to overcome the burden of demonstrating that this
rule was the least restrictive means of achieving those goals. 83 Under a rule
of reason analysis, courts have stated that a regulation will be deemed
unreasonable and in violation of the antitrust laws "where less restrictive
means than those used could have been employed.,
28 4
In Mackey, though the court accepted that there were pro-competitive
justifications for the NFL's Rozelle Rule, it was considered more restrictive
than necessary and "unreasonable in that it was overly broad, unlimited in
duration, [and] unaccompanied by procedural safeguards. '2Xi The current
eligibility rule is similarly harsh. Like that in Mackey, the Eligibility Rule
is overly broad in that it is an across-the-board ban on football players with
no regard to talent or age. A collegiate football player could be the LeBron
James of football but never get the chance to enter the NFL draft until the
stipulated time, regardless of team interest. Similarly, a situation could
arise where a talented player may have been held back in school and not
graduate high school until the age of 20. Under the NFL Eligibility Rule,
though a primary interest is protecting the safety of immature bodies, this
277. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621; see also Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066-67;
Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *9; Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317.
278. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322.
279. Id.
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athlete would not be able to enter the league until he is 23, whereas most
players can enter at age 2 1.286 Additionally, the league has not established
any procedural safeguards in relation to this rule.287 Whereas other leagues
have "excluded players only after their skill [has] been assessed, the
present rule is a blanket restriction... without any consideration of
talent. '288 It is clear that even if the NFL can successfully argue its pro-
competitive justifications, the New York District Court will likely
recognize that there are many alternative means to achieving these ends
than the overly restrictive rule adopted by the NFL.
IV. POLICY DISCUSSION
As seen in countless other antitrust jurisprudence rulings, "the
outcome of the case may not be decided on the merits as much as by the
ideological beliefs of the judge."289 Thus, it is important to view the
opposing policy arguments regarding the existence of the NFL Eligibility
Rule.
Notwithstanding the legal arguments already posed, strong policy
concerns may merit retaining the NFL Eligibility Rule in its present form.
Various sports commentators feel that many collegiate football players are
not physically or mentally ready to enter the NFL prior to the time the NFL
rule allows. 290 This is analogous to the pro-competitive justification
regarding safety. Even some current NFL players and coaches believe that
the bodies of younger athletes would not be able to survive the NFL.291 For
example, LaVar Arrington, a linebacker on the Washington Redskins, said
competing against a player currently ineligible "would be like hitting a
kid!"'292 Similarly, a scout for the Green Bay Packers explained that if a
collegiate freshman entered the NFL, "it would be the worst mistake he
ever made in his young, adolescent career .... People don't realize how
physically demanding football is.",
29 3
The mental ability and stamina players need to last through an NFL
286. See Dodd 1, supra note 3; see also ESPN.COM, supra note 2.
287. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322 (stating that procedural safeguards can weigh in
favor of upholding a league rule).
288. Id. at 1323.
289. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 211.
290. See Dodd 1, supra note 3 (discussing the viewpoint§ of various players and coaches).
291. See id.
292. Clarke, supra note 21.
293. Id.
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season is arguably more demanding than that of a college season.294 Pete
Carroll, the head coach at the University of Southern California, noted that
the pressure of the NFL requires a "level of focus and seriousness [that] are
beyond their years. ''295 Another consultant associated with the NFL draft
agreed that "[p]layers have no idea of how complicated systems are. They
just think it's, 'Red Right, 29 Toss, go to the line of scrimmage and run the
play.' It isn't that way.,
296
Not only is the game itself a mental challenge, but the lifestyle
surrounding professional football similarly requires a mentally mature
athlete.297 Life in the NFL is described as an atmosphere "so different than
the protective lifestyle of a college setting, where you have tight schedules
and restrictions. ' '298 Some believe that by forcing players to remain in
college for a certain number of years, the Eligibility Rule helps them obtain
an education in both their core subjects and also in life. 299 A final policy
concern pushed forward by the NFL is a desire to maintain the integrity of
the game. 300 An NFL spokesman noted that the game has succeeded for a
number of years with the current eligibility rule in place and the fact no
athlete has previously challenged it "suggests that the rule makes sense and
is working in everybody's best interest.",
30 1
However, there are a comparable number of sports authorities who
believe the Eligibility Rule is outdated and overly restrictive of collegiate
302athletes. In contrast to the previous policy arguments, other experts argue
that this physical barrier no longer exists as kids are getting "bigger and
stronger and faster . .. 303 The president of the Indiana Pacers, a franchise
in the NBA, believes "that the guys who come out of high school that have
the physical bodies can succeed right away." 3 4 Others assert that whether
these athletes are physically or mentally ready for the NFL does not matter
as long as there is a team who wants to draft them. 30 5 NFL franchises are
294. See Dodd 1, supra note 3.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. John Moredich, Mackovic, USC Coach Oppose Earlier Draft Eligibility, THE TUCSON
CITIZEN, Oct. 25, 2002, at 8C.
298. Id.
299. Cafardo, supra note 254.
300. See Dodd 1, supra note 3.
301. J.A. Adande, He Should Break Legal Tackle, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at D9.
302. See generally Dodd 1, supra note 3 (arguing that some collegiate athletes can
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multi-billion dollar companies run by experienced professionals who know
talent and know how to manage a business.0 6 A first round pick in the
2000 NFL Draft earned on average $1.5 million per year.30 7 These
corporations will not spend the millions of dollars necessary to hire draft
picks if they believe their "employee" will not survive. 30 8 It follows that the
teams themselves, and not the governing rules, should determine whether
an athlete possesses the appropriate ability to handle the learning curve or
possess the prototype physique.
In response to the NFL's desire to maintain the tradition of
professional football, those in favor of striking down the Eligibility Rule
can point to the eligibility standards of other successful professional
sports.30 9 The NFL upholds an eligibility rule that is uniquely restrictive
compared to most other professional sports entities, all of whom allow an
athlete to sign a contract or compete by the age of eighteen.310 In the Pro
Bowlers Association, bowlers can turn pro at eighteen without parental
consent as long as they have maintained an average score above 200.
311
Even younger bowlers can enter the league if they have parental consent
and can meet the talent requirements.312 If an athlete wishes to play
professional baseball, Major League Baseball will allow high school
students to be drafted onto professional teams after their senior year.
313
Similarly, American athletes are eligible for the NBA draft once their high
school class has graduated while foreign players must be eighteen.314 In
professional hockey, a sport arguably as violent as football, the NHL's
provisions state that a player must be eighteen to be eligible for the draft.31 5
The ATP, the governing body for professional tennis, allows athletes as
young as 14 to compete professionally. 316 That organization, unlike the
306. "The value of a National Football League team rose this year to an average of $628
million, up 19% from a year ago." Michael K. Ozanian, Showing You the Money, FORBES.COM
(Sept. 15, 2003), at http://www.forbes.comlfreeforbes/2003/0915/08ltab.html.
307. Dodd 1, supra note 3.
308. See id.
309. See generally Dennis Dodd, Eligibility Age Rules for Pro Leagues, Tours,
CBS.SPORTSLINE.COM (Sept. 1, 2003) available at
http://cbs.sportsline.com/collegefootbal/story/6609221 (listing eligibility rules for various
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NFL, has additional procedural safeguards including "limit[ed] media
access and... mentoring programs" for younger players. 317 Lower
eligibility standards "hasn't hurt the NBA, professional golf, tennis and
other sports that have big money to go along with big expectations, 318 so
why should the NFL be viewed as any different?
Furthermore, sports leagues with younger participants have not only
succeeded, but some of sports most recognized athletes joined the
professionals at younger ages than are now permitted by the NFL.319
Additionally, "[n]ine of the 15 players on the 2001-02 All-NBA team
played two years or less of college basketball. That's 60 percent of the
league's best players having less than three years of college basketball
experience., 320 The success of underage athletes in other sports upholds the
argument that younger players should be able to compete in the NFL.
A final policy argument in favor of lessening the harshness of the
Eligibility Rule is that many collegiate football players have pressing
financial needs.32' Unlike the college players of other sports, college
football players cannot turn professional and benefit from a financial
windfall that would help their underprivileged families because of this
rule.322 Clarett explained, "if the opportunity comes and you have a chance
to take care of your family, and your family would be set for the rest of
their lives, and don't have to go through things you went through, of course
I'm going to take the chance. 3 23 When an athlete has tremendous
professional market value, why play for close to nothing in college when he
can earn more favorable compensation and in the case of many young
athletes like Clarett, escape the dangerous neighborhoods they live in.324
Beyond a court's legal analysis of the NFL's Eligibility Rule, the
compelling policy arguments in favor of relaxing the NFL drafting
standards should sway the court to give Clarett and other collegiate athletes
317. Id.
318. Dodd 1, supra note 3.
319. Moses Malone and Bobby Orr are just a few examples of players who forced the court
in Linseman to "take judicial notice of the fact that many teenagers have played in the
professional ranks with distinction." Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1323
(D. Conn. 1977) (Modem-day examples include Kobe Bryant, Kevin Gamett, Alex Rodriguez
and Ken Griffey Jr., among others).
320. Dodd, supra note 3.
321. See id.; see also Wojciechowski 1, supra note 4 (discussing Clarett's background as
grounds for his desire to make money by playing professional football),
322. See Wojciechowski 1, supra note 4.
323. Wojciechowski 2, supra note 19.
324. Clarett saw his "next-door neighbor stagger toward [his] front lawn and bleed to death
on the grass[.]" Wojciechowski 1, supra note 4.
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in similar positions a chance to play professionally.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the preceding arguments, the outcome of this antitrust
analysis favors collegiate football players who have been excluded from
the NFL by way of its eligibility rule. If the Clarett court strikes down the
rule, most commentators agree that "[i]t's not going to open the
floodgates ... [and o]nly the (elite) players will benefit." '32 5 Without this
rule, the free market system will enable teams to self-regulate, deciding
which players belong in the league and which do not. Even given the fact
that any collegiate football player would be able to declare for the NFL
Draft, "that doesn't mean anyone is going to draft you. '326 Once a number
of unqualified underclassmen are rejected by teams on draft day, players
will realize that only the most exceedingly talented players will survive the
substantial leap to the NFL prior to their junior and senior years. As a
result, a number of athletes will have to remain in school for a period of
time similar to that imposed by the present rule.
Despite the present eligibility rule's apparent violation of the
Sherman Act, this does not mean there is not a need for an eligibility rule
that determines a potential player's eligibility status. There remain a
number of alternative eligibility standards that the NFL could utilize to
maintain its pro-competitive justifications. If the NFL is truly concerned
about athletes obtaining an education, a possible alternative is to lower the
league's eligibility standard to eighteen years of age and push the NCAA to
alter its rules regarding amateur status. Recently, the NCAA adopted a new
rule that "allows college athletes to apply for early entry into the NBA
without automatically forfeiting their remaining college eligibility. The rule
permits athletes to declare for early entry and then announce, 30 days after
the NBA Draft, whether or not they intend to return to collegiate
competition.,
327
Baseball players, as well, are treated differently than collegiate
football players. In contrast to the NFL, "MLB will draft players at the high
school and college levels without the players voluntarily entering the draft.
Even if a baseball player is drafted he does not lose his college eligibility.
The player can even entertain offers from the professional team that drafted
325. Tom Farrey, Brown Says Clarett can be "Pioneer," ESPN.COM (Sept. 23, 2003), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/printid=1 621965&type=story.
326. Id.
327. Tannenbaum, supra note 23, at 215.
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him without losing eligibility." 328 If the NCAA were to institute a similar
rule in college football, this would give athletes the opportunity to return to
school if they are not drafted in the NFL. However, under the current
system they are not afforded that luxury.329
Additionally, if the NFL motives for maintaining this rule-the
athlete's interests-are genuine, the NFL could create some type of
procedural safeguard by which collegiate football players could petition the
NFL for eligibility. Under this system, the league could survey its teams to
determine whether there is any interest in drafting a specific athlete. If the
teams express interest, the NFL could grant that individual a pass into the
league, and if they do not, the player understands his or her chances of
playing professionally, making it possible for that person to continue with
school. This rule, unlike the present eligibility provision, would take into
account ability and team interest, rather than banning the player from the
league without regard to either of these vital factors.
Regardless of whatever alternatives exist as to the present provision,
strong evidence would support a decision by the Clarett court to strike
down the NFL's current Eligibility Rule as a violation of the Sherman Act
because it is overly restrictive, particularly in light of case law and similar
rules throughout the sports world.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
Added February 20, 2004
A hole has opened up in the all-out ban that prevented Maurice
Clarett from playing professional football in the NFL.33 ° On February 5,
2004, the Honorable U.S. District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin supplied
Clarett and other previously excluded football players with a critical block
by declaring that the league's eligibility rule "must be sacked" due to its
violation of antitrust law.331
A. Case Summary
In the opinion, Judge Scheindlin noted that the case raised serious
questions at the crossroads of labor law and antitrust law, ultimately
328. Kobin, supra note 32, at 516.
329. Id. at 516-17.
330. See Associated Press, NFL Plans to Appeal Ruling (Feb. 5, 2004), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=l 727856.
331. Id. (quoting Clarett v. NFL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
[24:291
2004] MAURICE CLARETT TACKLES THE NFL ELIGIBILITY RULE 329
forcing the court to decide whether "Clarett's right to compete for a job in
the NFL... trump[s] the NFL's right to categorically exclude a class of
players that the league has decided is not yet ready to play."
332
To preserve the eligibility rule in its current form, the NFL raised
three primary arguments before the court.333 First, the league argued that
because the Rule is the result of a collective bargaining agreement between
the league and the NFLPA, it should be immune from antitrust scrutiny
under the nonstatutory labor exemption.334 Judge Scheindlin rejected this
proposal on the grounds that none of the key elements of the exemption335
were met, specifically noting that "the [Eligibility] Rule does not concern a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, governs only non-employees,
and did not clearly result from arm's length negotiations. 336
Next, the NFL contended that Clarett lacked standing to invoke the
antitrust act in the present suit, and therefore the league should be granted
summary judgment on the case.337 The court disagreed, however,
acknowledging that Clarett "has standing to sue because his injury flows
from a policy that excludes all players in his position from selling their
services to the only viable buyer-the NFL.
3 38
Finally, the NFL claimed that its eligibility rule was reasonable and
could, on its face, withstand antitrust scrutiny. 339 Due to the fact that the
NFL failed to illustrate the rule's promotion of competition, the Court
recognized that Clarett's injury is the very type "that the antitrust laws are
designed to prevent. ,340 After tackling each issue, Judge Scheindlin stated
that "while, ordinarily, the best offense is a good defense, none of these
332. Clarett v. NFL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See discussion supra Part I.C. In Mackey v. NFL, the Court stipulated that three
requirements must be met for the nonstatutory labor exemption to apply:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-
eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects only
the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be exempted
concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring
collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust
laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining.
543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
336. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *2-3.
337. Id. at *2.
338. Id. at *3.
339. Id. at *2.
340. Id. at *3
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defenses hold the line."34'
B. Upon Further Review: Clarett v. NFL on Appeal
Though the Southern District Court of New York ultimately came to
the conclusion proposed in the preceding Comment, 342 the particular
methods used by the Court could easily be called into question by the NFL
in its pending appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
343
1. Was the District Court's Analysis of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
Flawed?
To begin, the NFL may on appeal request that the Second Circuit
"throw a flag" on the district court's analysis of the nonstatutory labor
exemption.344 The court first rejected the NFL's bid for the exemption
because it believed the league's eligibility rule did not address a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. 345 Judge Scheindlin noted that absent from
the Eligibility Rule was any reference to wages, hours or conditions of
employment.346 The Court explained that "wages, hours, or working
conditions affect only those who are employed or eligible for
employment," and because the league rule makes a class of players
unemployable, it does not deal with a mandatory subject of bargaining.
347
This determination by the district court appears misguided, particularly
when requisite legal precedent and policies previously discussed in this
Comment are taken into consideration.348 Though there are no clear
guidelines established in determining the "working conditions" that the
NLRA deems are mandatory subjects of bargaining, previous courts have
held that the subject must "materially or significantly affect the terms or
conditions of employment. '" 349 A league rule concerning the eligibility of
341. Id. at *2 (emphasis in original).
342. See discussion supra Part V.
343. Associated Press, Lawyer: Clarett will be in Draft (Feb. 11, 2004), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1732768&type=story.
344. Associated Press, Commissioner Says NBA Will Not be Affected (Feb. 15, 2004), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/allstar2004/news/story?id=1736236.
345. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *38. The NLRA defines mandatory subject of
collective bargaining as "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (2003).
346. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *38.
347. Id.
348. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
349. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in
original); see also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
[24:291
MAURICE CLARE77 TACKLES THE NFL ELIGIBILITY RULE
potential players is essentially a restriction on the hiring practices of the
league employers-NFL teams. In any business, a company's hiring
practices are neither remote nor incidental to working conditions, but rather
serve a central role in defining the nature of the company. It is unclear how
the district court came to the conclusion that "conditions of employment"
have no effect on potential employees excluded by the subject of
bargaining; but the absence of any cited legal basis to the Court's comment
points to the fact that this is a novel and unsubstantiated idea.
Additionally, the Court's rejection of a case proffered by the NFL to
prove that its eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining is likely
to leave the Court of Appeals scratching its head. Judge Scheindlin
recognized that in Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n,35 ° the court
applied the "nonstatutory labor exemption because 'a mandatory subject of
bargaining pertinent in the instant matter is the circumstances under which
an employer may discharge or refuse to hire an employee."' 351 The opinion
noted that it is "simple" to understand how the court in Caldwell viewed
the "conditions under which an employer may terminate an employee" as a
mandatory subject of bargaining because that court "treated the refusal to
hire as synonymous with the dismissal.
352
Once again, Judge Scheindlin seems misguided. She first quotes a
portion of the Caldwell opinion that states that "a mandatory subject of
bargaining.., is the circumstances under which an employer may...
refuse to hire an employee., 353 She then asserts that the nonstatutory labor
exemption was applied in Caldwell because a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining is "the conditions under which an employer may
terminate an employee," which is "synonymous" with the conditions under
which an employer may refuse to hire an employee.354 Yet in light of both
of these comments, Judge Scheindlin stated that the NFL's Eligibility Rule,
which stipulates the conditions under which a team must refuse to hire a
prospective employee, is inexplicably not a mandatory subject.355 One of
the NFL's key arguments on appeal will likely be that Judge Scheindlin's
application of this prong of the nonstatutory labor exemption is incorrect.
The Court also denied the NFL's request for an exemption on the
grounds that the Eligibility Rule affected parties outside of the collective
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); NLRB v. USPS, 18 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1994).
350. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).




355. See id. at *44.
2004]
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bargaining relationship.356 The reasoning supporting this conclusion is both
erroneous and somewhat convoluted. 57 Judge Scheindlin acknowledges
that "there is no dispute that collective bargaining agreements, and
therefore the nonstatutory labor exemption, apply to both prospective and
current employees. 358 Clarett is no doubt a prospective employee of the
league since he will be eligible to be drafted within a year; but curiously
the district court noted that his particular situation is "very different.,
359
First, Judge Scheindlin explained that "Clarett's eligibility was not the
union's to trade away., 36 0 However, she neglected to fully justify her
seemingly contradictory acceptance of the union's ability to trade away a
future player's right to choose where to play and for what salary (as is the
case with the NFL Draft) while rejecting the union's power to control
eligibility.36 Such was the case in Zimmerman v. NFL, where a potential
NFL player challenged the league's supplemental draft, arguing that the
labor exemption should not apply since prospective employees outside of
the bargaining unit were most hard-hit by the draft's impact.3 62 The
Zimmerman court concluded that this prong of the labor exemption was
satisfied because "potential future players" who enter the bargaining unit at
a later time are bound by its terms.363 Judge Scheindlin acknowledged that
"employees who are hired after the collective bargaining agreement is
negotiated are nonetheless bound by its terms because they step into the
shoes of the players who did engage in collective bargaining. ',364 However,
Clarett is no different than the countless other prospective employees who
were bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement of the
profession they wish to enter; it is unclear how and why the district court
elected to treat him in this distinct way.
At the conclusion of its analysis, the district court refused to apply the
nonstatutory labor exemption as a shield for the NFL Eligibility Rule
because the league "failed to demonstrate that the Rule evolved from
arm's-length negotiations between the NFLMC [(National Football League
Management Council)] and the NFLPA [(National Football League Players
356. Id. at *45.
357. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
358. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *45.
359. Id. at *46.
360. Id.
361. See generally Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
362. Id. at 405; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.
363. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.
364. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *46-47.
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Association)]. 365 While the court's previous analysis of this exemption
seemed off-base, Judge Scheindlin's breakdown of this element appears to
be proper. To support this refusal, the court traced the evolution of the
Eligibility Rule in order to show that it could not have developed from the
collective bargaining process. 366 Judge Scheindlin highlights the fact that
though the Eligibility Rule was created in 1925, the NFLPA was not
formed until 1956 and, furthermore, did not become the players' exclusive
bargaining agent until 1968.367 The fact that the Eligibility Rule predates
the formation of the NFLPA and the collective bargaining process, seems
to indicate that it was unilaterally created by the league and not the result of
arm's-length bargaining. 368 This line of reasoning is strengthened by
Mackey, where the Eighth Circuit took note of the fact that the league's
Rozelle Rule had remain unmodified since it was unilaterally forced upon
the players by the NFL in 1963, prior to the league's established collective
bargaining relationship with the NFLPA.369 This led the Mackey court to
conclude that nothing in the parties' collective bargaining relationship
concerning the rule could be characterized as legitimate bargaining, thus
precluding the application of the nonstatutory labor exemption.37 °
In response, the NFL did a very poor job maintaining that the
Eligibility Rule was addressed during collective bargaining negotiations.
The only evidence they presented to the court was the Declaration of Peter
Ruocco, the Senior Vice President of Labor Relations of the NFL
Management Council, asserting: "During the course of collective
bargaining that led to the 1993 CBA, the eligibility rule itself was the
subject of collective bargaining. 37' However, as noted earlier in this
Comment, there is no reference to the Eligibility Rule anywhere in the
CBA to signify that it was a focal point of negotiations.372 Rather, as the
district court points out, the only language within the CBA that relates to
the Eligibility Rule states that the NFLPA "waived ... its rights to bargain
365. Id. at *47.
366. See id.
367. Id. (citing Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1976) aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 193 U.S. App. D.C. 19, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) ("As of March 5, 1968, the
National Football League Players Association became the exclusive bargaining agent and
representative of the NFL players. This union executed its first collective bargaining agreement
with the NFL owners in November of 1968 .... ) Id.
368. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *48.
369. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
370. See id.
371. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *48.
372. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
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over any provision of the Constitution and Bylaws. 373
A similar type of "zipper clause" was rejected as evidence of bona
fide arm's-length bargaining by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey.374 There, the
1970 CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA neglected to make any
express reference to the Rozelle Rule, but rather stated: "This Agreement
represents a complete and final understanding on all bargainable subjects of
negotiation among the parties during the term of this Agreement. 3 75 This
clause demonstrated that the players decided not to bargain over or
challenge the Rozelle Rule, alternatively choosing to consent to the status
quo.376 Without any further evidence that the rule was actually a focal point
of negotiations, however, the Eighth Circuit refused to grant an exemption
because "the union's acceptance of the status quo ... [could not] serve to
immunize the Rozelle Rule from the scrutiny of the Sherman Act."
377
The "zipper clause" present in Clarett is likewise just an acceptance
of the status quo without any further negotiation, and thus was correctly
rejected as evidence of arm's-length bargaining by the district court.378
Judge Scheindlin properly points out that this waiver not only
"demonstrate[d] that the union agreed not to bargain over or challenge the
Rule... [but also] in no way demonstrate[d] that the Rule itself arose from,
or was agreed to during, the process of collective bargaining." 379 Therefore,
the district court appropriately withheld application of this exemption.
Though this third and final element of the nonstatutory labor
exception appears to have been applied correctly by the district court, the
NFL does have a few options on appeal. First, the league could present
support that adds more evidentiary weight than a mere declaration to
strengthen their claim that the Eligibility Rule was a focal point of
negotiations at some stage of the collective bargaining process.38°
373. Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *49 (emphasis in original) (referencing
Articles III, IV, and IX of the 1993 CBA).
374. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613.
375. Id.
376. See id.
377. Id. at 616.
378. See Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *49.
379. Id.
380. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1200-02 (6th Cir. 1979). In
McCourt, several pieces of evidence led to the Sixth Circuit's determination that arm's-length
bargaining over the NHL's reserve clause had occurred. Such evidence included witness
testimony providing exact dates of meetings spanning over three years in which the reserve clause
was negotiated between the players' union and the league, the creation of a special committee by
the league to specifically discuss a new clause, the numerous back and forth rejection of proposed
clauses, and the threat of a potential strike by the players as a bargaining tactic. Id.
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Alternatively, the NFL may argue that the "zipper clause" present in the
CBA is not merely an acceptance of the status quo by the players' union,
but rather an acceptance of that waiver (which encompasses the Eligibility
Rule) was bargained for in exchange for some other benefit to the
constituents of the union.38 1 In Mackey, the NFL argued that the union
accepted the "zipper clause" because "the players derive indirect benefit
from the Rozelle Rule... [in that] the union's agreement to the Rozelle
Rule was a quid pro quo for increased pension benefits and the right of
players to individually negotiate their salaries. 382 Though the Eighth
Circuit could find no such quidpro quo to support the league's argument in
Mackey,38 3 if the NFL in Clarett can prove in its appeal that a "fair amount
of give and take took place 3 84 over the waiver and that the union actually
received a specific benefit in return for its agreement not to bargain over
the Eligibility Rule, the court may conclude that bona fide arm's-length
bargaining over the rule did take place and thus the exemption should be
applied. However, unless the NFL can present evidence of give-and-take
bargaining that reflects more than the mere comment that the Eligibility
Rule was a focal point of negotiations, the court should affirm on the issue
of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
2. Did the District Court Incorrectly Grant Summary Judgment?
Finally, the NFL can argue that the district court's application of
summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues as to material
facts remain. 385 In its response to Clarett's complaint and motion for
381. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 407.
385. The Clarett court explained: Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "An issue of fact is
'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party."' A fact is material when it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law."' A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue
of material fact exists. In turn, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must raise a genuine issue of material fact. To do so, he "must show more than a 'metaphysical
doubt' as to material facts," and he may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation. Rather, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence that supports his
pleadings. In this regard, "the 'mere existence of a scintilla of evidence' supporting the non-
movant's case is also insufficient to defeat summary judgment." In determining whether a
genuine issue of material facts exists, the court must construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor. Accordingly, the
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summary judgment, the NFL asked that "if the suit is not dismissed on the
[exemption or standing] grounds... a trial is needed to determine whether
the Rule is a reasonable restraint of trade. 386 However, after rejecting the
NFL's bid for summary judgment on its defenses, the district court
believed that there was no basis for sending the rule of reason inquiry to a
jury.387 In granting Clarett his request for summary judgment, Judge
Scheindlin said, "[t]here is no need to proceed to trial or engage in fact-
finding because the league has failed, as a matter of law, to offer any pro-
competitive justifications for the Rule. Accordingly, no jury is required to
find that the anticompetitive effects of the Rule outweigh its pro-
competitive benefits. 388
This decision by the district court may be regarded as erroneous for
two reasons. First, courts and sports legal analysts seem to agree that
summary judgment should be used "sparingly" in antitrust cases involving
player restraints. 389 The Ninth Circuit in Neeld expressed that sustaining the
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact "is
particularly rigorous in antitrust cases (especially) where motive and intent
are important. ' 390 Other cases governing player restraint issues have
accorded summary judgment only after skipping the fact intensive analysis
of the rule of reason by utilizing the per se approach. 39' Gary Roberts, an
antitrust and sports law expert at Tulane University, believes that "[Judge]
Scheindlin was 'flat-out wrong' for granting summary judgment in favor of
Clarett without a full trial, given the complicated factual analysis involved
in an antitrust complaint., 392 Jim McKeown, another antitrust and sports
law expert who provided legal assistance for Major League Baseball,
agrees that Judge Scheindlin gave little consideration to the NFL's pro-
court's task is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate "if there
is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving
party." Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *24-27.
386. Id. at *24.
387. See id. at *89.
388. Id.
389. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Len Pasquarelli, Stay of
Order Likely Won't Come in Time, ESPN.cOM (Feb. 5, 2004), at
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1 728262&type=story [hereinafter Pasquarelli 2].
390. Neeld, 594 F.2d at 1300 (citing Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Mgmt. Co., 553 F.2d
620, 624 (9th Cir. 1977)).
391. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see
also Boris v. United States Football League, No. CV 83 4980, 1984. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
392. See Pasquarelli 2, supra note 383.
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competitive arguments in justification of the Eligibility Rule.393 He stated,
"I would never say the judge was negligent.... But she did not want to
consider any effects in other markets. 394
Second, the district court cast off each and every justification
presented by the NFL without any analysis whatsoever.395 The NFL's first
justification-to protect underdeveloped athletes from injury-was
"dismissed out of hand" by the Court.3 96 The Court's failure to address this
issue is troubling due to the fact that Neeld upheld the reasonableness of an
eligibility restraint because it was based primarily on the interest of
participant safety.397 In explaining the standard for summary judgment, the
district court explained that its "task is not to 'weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial."' '398 However, it seems here that Judge Scheindlin
ignored this standard. Though there is a genuine issue as to whether these
justifications put forth by the NFL are sufficient, the Court seemingly
determined the truth of the matter for itself, relieving itself of the
responsibility to hold a jury trial in which the jury would the evidence. As a
result, the NFL may be successful in establishing that the district court's
decision to grant summary judgment was flawed, as a complicated antitrust
analysis was necessary.
In light of the preceding arguments, it would not be surprising to see
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remand this case or conduct a de novo
review to ensure that the proper analysis is accorded to this historic debate.
Regardless of whether the facts of this case are ultimately placed in the
hands of a judge or jury, the legal arguments examined in this Comment
demonstrate that the present form of the NFL Eligibility Rule is in violation
of antitrust law and must be revised.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See Clarett, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396, at *86-89. The NFL offered four
justifications in support of the Eligibility Rule:
[1] protecting younger and/or less experienced players-that is, players who are
less mature physically and psychologically-from heightened risks of injury in
NFL games; [2] protecting the NFL's entertainment product from the adverse
consequences associated with such injuries; [3] protecting the NFL clubs from the
costs and potential liability entailed by such injuries; and [4] protecting from injury
and self-abuse other adolescents who would over-train-and use steroids-in the
misguided hope of developing prematurely the strength and speed required to play
in the NFL.
Id. at *85.
396. Id. at *86.
397. Neeld, 594 F.2d at 1300.
398. Clarett. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1396. at *27.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW
C. Is Clarett Still the Right Person to be Challenging This Rule?
An issue in this case that has escaped attention is that of the
constitutionality of Clarett's claim. If, by chance, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reverses the district court's decision, Clarett will by that time
either be a member of an NFL team (which will no doubt refuse to void the
contract of a player with which they expended a high draft pick) or enough
time will have lapsed so that he would be eligible under the current NFL
rule. This scenario presents a procedural problem. Due to the fact that
Clarett brought suit against the NFL as a sole plaintiff, rather than as a
representative of a class of ineligible athletes, Clarett will no longer be a
real party in interest and the suit will become moot. 399 As a result,
399. "'[Flederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them.' The inability of the federal judiciary 'to review moot cases
derives from the requirement of Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial
power depends upon the existence of a case of controversy."' Defunis v. Odegarrd, 416 U.S. 312,
316 (1974). In Defunis, the Supreme Court found that the controversy surrounding a student at
the University of Washington Law School had ceased to be "definite and concrete" and no longer
involved parties having adverse legal positions because the student would have finished his law
school education regardless of any decision the court reached on the merits of the case. Id.
Clarett's case is strikingly similar in that he may become eligible under the prior rule or be
drafted onto an NFL team and enter the league before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is ever
given a chance to review the case. Additionally, Clarett's case, like Defunis, presents no question
that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" since Clarett will never again have be subject to
the NFL's draft eligibility rles. See id. at 318-19. As a result, there would no longer be a live
case or controversy and any decision by the court would be an "advisory opinion."
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ineligible college football players will continue to be banned from the NFL
until another Spencer Haywood, Robert Boris or Maurice Clarett accepts
the burden of sacking this league rule. It took seventy-eight years for the
first attempt, there is no telling how long it would take for a second.
Robert D. Koch*
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